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1 INTRODUCTION 
The increase in the size and production capacity of 
air separation plants, has led to a growing capacity 
of cryogenic liquid storage installations at produc-
tion sites. Therefore, considering the potential haz-
ards associated with liquid products has become a 
fundamental issue to address, together with the esti-
mation of the effects of a major release of liquid on 
the local environment, and the development of pre-
ventive measures. 
   Nowadays, evaluating the structural safety of the 
cryogenic tanks by critically examining the integrity 
of new or existing constructions is a common prac-
tice. To do this, non-destructive testing methods for 
flaws detection are usually performed, whereas ac-
ceptability criteria for the revealed flaws have been 
defined in standards of the sector. In this respect, a 
typical approach to demonstrate the safety of a struc-
ture containing defects is to design it under the leak-
before-break (LBB) criterion; the scope is to guaran-
tee that in nominal operating conditions the stress 
conditions inside the structure are such that the 
growth of flaws leaves time for a stable leak of the 
liquefied gas preceding the occurrence of a sudden 
disruptive break of the structure. Thus, a leakage of 
fluid through a crack can be detected before it reach-
es a critical dimension; this allows preventing cata-
strophic liquefied gas releases. 
In practice, the LBB design criterion is based on 
setting two critical values for the crack length: lC and 
lL. The former represents the maximum length that 
prevents the tank from experiencing a catastrophic 
rupture; the latter represents the minimum length to 
have a fluid leakage. To meet the LBB criterion, the 
designers have to prove that lL < lC with a suitable 
margin: in this case, a fluid leakage is detected be-
fore the catastrophic failure. In particular, the analy-
sis is conducted at the most risky vessel sections, i.e, 
the sections with extreme loading conditions and 
poorest material properties. 
However, the traditional LBB approach suffers 
from the limitation of considering the tank behavior 
in nominal operating conditions, only. Indeed, it is 
also interesting to analyze the worst case rupture 
scenario, which, for the structure under study, coin-
cides with the tank catastrophic rupture, caused by 
potential malfunctions of the control system or the 
safety devices. 
In this context, the paper proposes a new ap-
proach to the assessment of the risks related to the 
catastrophic rupture of a flat bottom cryogenic tank 
containing Liquefied Oxygen (LOX). The rupture is 
considered catastrophic if it leads to an uncontrolla-
ble nearly-instantaneous release of the entire lique-
fied gas content. The assessment aims at reaching a 
comprehensive understanding of the problems relat-
ed to the tank rupture, from the investigation of the 
causes of abnormal operating conditions up to the 
analysis of the associated structural consequences, 
within a probabilistic framework. 
The proposed procedure consists of two parts. In 
the first part, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) guide the 
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investigation of the storage system in order to identi-
fy the critical events that may evolve in dangerous 
scenarios affecting the structural safety of the tank, 
together with the associated occurrence frequencies. 
This part of the study also includes sensitivity and 
uncertainty analysis, which allow improving the ro-
bustness of the results. In the second part, structural 
analyses based on Finite Element Methods (FEM) 
are performed to investigate the behavior of the tank 
in both ordinary and abnormal operating conditions. 
In particular, the abnormal conditions are those in 
which the vessel is under exceptional stresses, due to 
the critical scenarios identified by FMEA and FTA. 
The combination of FMEA, FTA and FEM structur-
al analyses allows identifying and assessing the 
stress conditions which may lead to a catastrophic 
rupture of the tank. The main outcome of such an 
analysis is a list of recommendations such as the in-
stallation of protective equipment and instrumenta-
tion, definition of a strategy for equipment inspec-
tion and testing, identification of the components for 
which a re-design may be convenient, etc. This al-
lows reducing the occurrence of large releases of 
cryogenic fluids, by providing useful guidelines to 
the engineers directly involved in the design, instal-
lation, operation and maintenance of bulk cryogenic 
liquid storage systems. 
2 CASE STUDY 
The methodology is illustrated by way of a real case 
study concerning a LOX flat bottom cryogenic tank, 
owned by SOL Group and sited in Frankfurt. The 
analysis focuses on the cryogenic tank and all the 
pieces of equipment connected to it. This is compli-
ant to the definition of tank given by EIGA IGC 
Doc. 127/13/E(EIGA 2013):  
“the total fixed assembly of liquid storage tank(s) in-
tegrated with other equipment, such as pumps, fill-
ing equipment, pressure build-up vaporizers, con-
trols and other related ancillary equipment that are 
connected to it.” 
The cryogenic tank is made up of two different 
structures: the internal vessel, which is designed to 
contain the cryogenic liquid, and the outer casing, 
which contains the insulating material that ensures a 
correct storage of the liquefied gas. The inner tank, 
with capacity of 2000m
3
, is made of stainless steel 
A240-304; this material is capable of withstanding 
cryogenic temperatures of the liquefied oxygen, 
which is stored at -183 °C, at nearly atmospheric 
pressure (-0.0022 bar < P < 0.095 bar). The outer 
casing, made of A283 grC, is not designed to with-
stand low temperatures, as it is not wetted by lique-
fied oxygen in normal operations. 
Both vessels are connected to a number of com-
ponents which allow performing the liquefied oxy-
gen load and unload operations, and guarantee that 
the operating pressure, temperature and level condi-
tions are close to the corresponding design values.  
The tank is usually filled with the liquefied oxy-
gen from the liquefaction unit, although sometimes 
it can be stocked up with liquid from tanker track. 
The unloading operation is performed by means of 
cryogenic pumps, which fill the tanker tracks for fi-
nal distribution. A drain system is also installed on 
the inner vessel to allow the complete  removal of 
the stored liquid in emergency conditions. 
The annular space delimited between the inner 
and outer vessels is intended to ensure a thermal in-
sulation. To this aim, it is filled up with perlite, an 
amorphous volcanic glass with high insulating char-
acteristics and light weight. Moreover, to guarantee 
a better insulation quality, the annular space is also 
continuously flushed with nitrogen, which allows 
keeping the insulation in a dry state. The nitrogen 
flow is provided by nozzles located at the inner ves-
sel bottom, and is released in proximity of the top of 
the tank. 
Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the material 
properties and the operating conditions of the inner 
vessel and the annular space, respectively. 
  
Table 1. Material properties. 
___________________________________________________ 
                                                        Oxygen   Nitrogen        
__________________________________________________ 
Content in air         21 Vol %   78.1 Vol % 
Gas density (1.013 bar , 15 °C )  1.36 kg/m
3
   1.19 kg/m
3
 
Boiling temperature (1.013 bar )  -183 °C   -196 °C 




Table 2. Operating conditions for the LOX storage system. 
___________________________________________________ 
            Inner tank  Annular space 
                                                        Oxygen   Nitrogen        
___________________________________________________ 
Temperature          -183 °C    +20 °C 
Vapor space press max       +0.095 bar   +0.01 bar   
Max negative pressure      -0.0022 bar    -0.0022 bar 
Max level            14.32  m  
___________________________________________________ 
 
The operating conditions are controlled by two 
redundant systems: an equipment installed to regu-
late the value of the parameters during normal op-
erations, and a set of safety devices to prevent the 
occurrence of dangerous conditions in the tanks, 
when regulating system fails. In addition, the vessels 
are provided with detectors and alarms, which go off 
when measured parameters assume unexpected val-
ues.  
3 A NOVEL APPROACH TO RISK 
ASSESSMENT OF A CRYOGENIC TANK 
The risk associated to the catastrophic rupture of the 
cryogenic storage system described above has been 
studied by applying a novel and comprehensive ap-
proach, which can be summarized in the following 
three steps: 
1. FMEA and FTA. These traditional techniques of 
risk analysis allow identifying the critical events 
that may lead to dangerous scenarios affecting 
the structural safety of the tank, and estimating 
the associated occurrence frequencies. 
2. Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses, which are 
performed to assess the robustness of the results 
obtained from the previous step. 
3. Structural analyses, performed to evaluate the 
severity of the consequences of the tank rupture 
both in ordinary operating conditions and in the 
critical scenarios identified by FMEA and FTA.  
 
In the following Sections, the different steps are de-
tailed, and the corresponding results commented. 
3.1 Identification of critical events dangerous for 
the structural safety of the cryogenic tank 
3.1.1 Procedure 
In the first step of the procedure, a FMEA study 
is performed, whose core is to go over all the poten-
tial component failure modes, identify the conse-
quent losses of system functionalities and configure 
the resulting outcomes from the accidental scenari-
os; a qualitative evaluation of the criticality of the 
failure modes is also given by the analysts in terms 
of severity of consequences and likelihood of occur-
rence. These two latter attributes, severity and likeli-
hood, are the entries of a criticality matrix, which al-
lows assessing whether the failure modes are critical 
and violate the safety requirements. 
This analysis has supported a full understanding 
of the system at hand, and its main outcomes have 
been: 
 The functions implemented by the system; 
 The items involved in performing these func-
tions; 
 The consequence of each loss of function. This 
information is used for the identification of the 
most severe events in relation to the tank integri-
ty, to be further investigated; 
 The identification of the most critical elements 
of the system, whose malfunctions can affect the 
integrity of the tank or the success of functions 
that concur in assuring the structural integrity; 
 The identification of the failure modes and fail-
ure rates associated to the critical items; 
 The detection means of the different failure 
modes; 
 The redundancies of the system, listed in the 
fields “compensatory measures” and “remarks”. 
 
Once the critical events have been identified, a 
quantitative FTA has been carried out to estimate the 
occurrence frequencies of the undesired events.  
3.1.2 Results 
The functioning of the storage system has been ana-
lyzed with respect to eight main functions: 
1. Inner tank pressure regulation; 
2. Inner tank pressure safety control; 
3. Inner tank level safety control; 
4. Liquid extraction; 
5. Liquid introduction; 
6. Insulation; 
7. Annular space pressure safety control; 
8. Oxygen containment. 
 
The FMEA has shown that the safety related func-
tions are the most critical among the eight above. 
This is an expected result, as safety related functions 
are involved in mitigating or compensating condi-
tions potentially dangerous for the tank integrity. In 
this respect, Table 3 shows the critical functions and 
the subsystems involved in their implementations. 
 
Table 3: Critical functions and related subsystems. 
 
 
Finally, the procedure has allowed to identify 
four critical events and their occurrence frequencies: 
 TOP event 1: overpressure in the inner tank 
(pressure > 95mbar), as consequence of the mal-
function of the pressure safety subsystems; 
 TOP event 2: under pressure (i.e., vacuum) in the 
inner tank (pressure < -2.2mbar), as consequence 
of the malfunction of the pressure safety subsys-
tems; 
 TOP event 3: extreme liquid level in the inner 
tank (level > 14.32m), as consequence of the 
malfunction of the level safety subsystems; 
 TOP event 4: overpressure in the annular space 
(pressure > 10mbar), as consequence of the mal-
function of the pressure safety subsystems. 
 
The failure frequencies of the four critical events, 
at time t= 20 years are listed in Table 4. In particu-
lar, these values refer to two different settings:  
1. The Pressure Safety Valves (PSV) installed on 











ANNULAR SPACE  
PRESSURE 
SAFETY CONTROL 
Pressure Safety Valve  PSV4001 
Pressure Safety Valve  PSV4002 
 
 
Differential pressure level meter 
                                     LT/LI4002 
Differential pressure level meter 
                                    LT/LI4003 
Level switch   LSHH/LSH4004 
 
Pressure Safety Valve  PSV4003 
Pressure Safety Vent    PSE4001 
 
FUNCTIONS Associated SUBSYSTEMS 
sures are periodically inspected, with a period of 
4 years; 
2. PSV are not inspected.  
 
In this respect, notice that the regular inspection 
and maintenance of the pressure safety devices is not 
mandatory for the typology of tank under analysis, 
since the particular vessel is not required to comply 
with the Pressure Equipment Directive (97/23/EC). 
 
The two different work hypotheses yield two val-
ues of occurrence frequencies. In fact, the inspection 
interval enters the quantification of the availability 
of dormant devices such as the safety valves degra-
dation (Zio 2007). In particular, from Table 3 it 
emerges that even when the PSV are not periodically 
inspected, the frequencies of the four top events 





small values of these frequencies are due to the fact 
that long sequences of failure events have to occur to 
get the top event; in addition, as illustrated in Table 
3, there is  redundancy of safety control devices. 
On the other side, from Table 4 it also emerges 
that when the PSV are regularly maintained, then the 
occurrence frequencies of the top events decrease 
significantly. Therefore, a periodic inspection of the 
PSVs is highly recommended for any generic flat 
bottom cryogenic tank, even if not mandatory. 
 
Table 4. Occurrence frequencies of critical events. 
___________________________________________________  
           Failure frequency 
events/year 
___________________________________________________ 
       PSV inspected    PSV not inspected __________________________________________________ 
TOP event 1   8.76  e-12     7.86  e-10 
TOP event 2    3.64  e-10     3.27  e-8 
TOP event 3   8.30  e-9     7.93  e-8 
TOP event 4    1.85  e-10     1.68  e-8 
__________________________________________________ 
3.2 Robustness of the results 
Importance, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses 
have been performed in order to investigate the ro-
bustness of the results. In particular, these additional 
analyses have been carried out for every critical 
event, with a twofold scope: 
1. Identifying the component failures or basic 
events which most influence the event occur-
rence frequency. This allows to identify the sys-
tem weaknesses, and provides guidelines for ef-
fective actions for system improvements; 
2. Estimating the uncertainty on the critical event 
occurrence frequencies, which comes from the 
lack of precise knowledge about the failure mod-
el parameters. 
3.2.1 Importance analysis 
Generally speaking, Importance Measures (IMs) aim 
at quantifying the contribution of components or 
basic events to the considered measure of system 
performance, which can be the system reliability, 
unreliability, unavailability or risk, depending on the 
application (Zio 2007; Baraldi et al. 2009). Infor-
mation about the importance of the components con-
stituting a system with respect to its safety and 
availability is of great practical aid: the identification 
of the components which mostly determine the over-
all system behaviour allows identifying system vul-
nerabilities and the most effective actions for the 
system improvement.  
Different IMs have been proposed in literature, 
which allow investigating different system features. 
In particular, the Birnbaum IM expresses the contri-
bution to system reliability of the reliability of the 
various system components (Baraldi et al. 2013). In 
details, components for which a variation in the reli-
ability results in the largest variation of the system 
reliability have the highest importance. Thus, a re-
duction in the occurrence probability of the most 
important events is expected to result in a reduction 
of the occurrence probability of the TOP event. 
With reference to the analysed case study, the 
Birnbaum IM have been computed for each basic 
event constituting the Fault Trees of the four inves-
tigated critical events. This has allowed to identify 
the most important basic events, and thus the im-
provement actions with the highest priority.  
The results of the analysis can be summarized as 
follows: 
• The failure of the inner tank pressure Safety Valves 
greatly influences two out of four critical events 
(TOP event 1 and TOP event 2). Then, improving 
the reliability of these items is expected to lead to 
a great improvement in system reliability; 
• Redundancy in the monitoring system of the con-
trol valves in the inner tank pressure would sig-
nificantly reduce the occurrence probability of the 
critical TOP event 1; 
• A good control during the operation of tank filling 
and emptying is recommended in order to reduce 
the probability of occurrence of the critical TOP 
events 2 and 3; 
• The failure of the Pressure Control Valves 
PCV9039 (i.e., the valves regulating the nitrogen 
purging into the annular space between the inner 
and outer vessels) greatly influences the occur-
rence of the critical TOP event 4. 
An uncertainty analysis has been performed in order 
to assess the robustness of the results of the im-
portance analyses. In fact, the importance measures 
depend on the values of the failure probabilities of 
the components of the storage system, which are un-
certain. Thus, the results of the importance analysis 
need to be checked against the variability due to the 
uncertainty in the model input parameters. To do 
this, uncertainty in the occurrence probabilities of 
the most important basic events has been considered 
by uniform distributions with lower and upper 
bounds provided by SOL experts. The analysis has 
highlighted that the uncertainties in the occurrence 
probabilities of the basic events do not impact on the 
ranking of the most important causes identified for 
each TOP event: thus, the results discussed above 
can be considered robust. 
3.2.2 Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis 
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, FTA has been per-
formed to calculate the occurrence probabilities of 
the four critical events identified by the FMEA 
study.  
In general, FTA allows resolving a TOP event in-
to the combination of single primary events, which 
contribute to its realization. Then, the probability of 
the TOP event is computed as function of the proba-
bilities of the basic events. However, in practice it is 
often difficult to evaluate the exact probability val-
ues of the primary events, which are affected by un-
certainties. These latter need to be propagated 
through the Fault Tree model to assess the variabil-
ity in the Top event failure probability due to the 
variability in the probability values of the basic 
events.  
Two different analysis have been carried out, 
both based on Monte Carlo (MC) method: 
 Sensitivity analysis to identifying the contribu-
tion of the various basic events to the uncertainty 
in the TOP event. 
 Uncertainty analysis to propagate the uncertain-
ties from the basic events up to the TOP events. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis have shown 
that the estimations of the probabilities of the critical 
events are significantly influenced by the uncertain-
ties in the failure probability values of the PSVs, 
human errors and uncontrolled filling and emptying 
operations. Then, improving the knowledge about 
the occurrence probability values of the identified 
events would reduce the uncertainty in the overall 
system reliability.  
Once the most influent basic events have been 
identified, MC sampling technique has allowed to 
estimate the probability distribution expressing the 
variability in the probability of occurrence of every 
TOP event considered. Such distributions have 
shown that the values of the occurrence probability 
calculated without uncertainty, are always near to 
the values of the distributions associated to highest 
probability (distributions modes). However, the oc-
currence probability reference values are located to-
ward the low values of the probability distributions. 
This finding entails that disregarding the uncertainty 
in the top event probability values does not lead to 
conservative results, and thus highlights the im-
portance of giving due account to the uncertainty in 
reliability assessments. 
3.3 Structural analysis 
The Finite Element Method (FEM) has been used to 
perform the structural analysis to demonstrate the 
LBB criterion in both nominal and deviated condi-
tions. FEM is a numerical technique for resolving 
complex problems, widely used in structural me-
chanics. The structural system to be studied is mod-
eled by a set of finite elements interconnected at 
points, called nodes, that are organized in a mesh. 
The analysis provides the stresses and displace-
ments, in each single element of the mesh. There-
fore, the FEM methodology allows to identify the 
most stressed portions of the analyzed object.  
For the case under study, the flat bottom tank has 
been modeled with a mesh of 262919 elements and 
264267 nodes. The FEM analyses have been per-
formed considering the tank behavior both in nomi-
nal operating conditions and in conditions of ex-
treme loads, caused by the occurrence of the critical 
events identified by the previous failure analyses. 
The loads in ordinary conditions and the material 




Figure 1: Von Mises stresses in the internal vessel under exter-
nal ordinary pressure. 
 
As expected, the analysis performed in ordinary 
conditions has shown that the tank is not subjected 
to excessive stresses and strains when everything 
operates normally: both Von Mises stresses and dis-
placements are smaller than the maximum allowable 
limit set by the designers. Moreover, the analysis has 
highlighted the weakness of the structure in corre-
spondence of the conjunction between the wall and 
the dome of the inner vessel. This is due to the fact 
that the stresses concentrated in this portion of the 
structure are very high, as exemplified in Figure 1 
which shows the stress level in the inner tank under 
external pressure, in nominal conditions. 
Analyses relevant to the critical scenarios have 
been carried out with the purpose of identifying the 
extreme values of pressure (TOP event 1, 2 and 4) 
and liquid level (TOP event 3) that leads to the rup-
ture of the tank structure. The resulting values are 
summarized in Table 5. 
In particular, no value is reported for TOP event 3, 
corresponding to the scenario of tank overfilling. In-
deed, the analysis has shown that the criticality of 
such scenario is not due to the hydrostatic pressure 
of the liquid, but to the overpressure generated by 
the pumps that introduce the LOX in the vessel. 
Therefore, the TOP events 3 is analyzed similarly to 
TOP event 1 (i.e., overpressure in the inner tank). 
 
Table 5. Extreme loads that lead to tank rupture.  
___________________________________________________  __________________________________________________ 
             Parameter      Max value  
__________________________________ 
TOP event 1   Pressure inner tank    187.5 mbar 
TOP event 2    Pressure inner tank   -175    mbar  
TOP event 3   Level in inner tank      _--------------  
TOP event 4    Pressure annular space  1610  mbar 
__________________________________________________ 
 
The values listed in Table 5 are expected to be 
reached gradually, with a slow variation in the level 
and pressure values. This operating condition makes 
reasonable to assume that if cracks appear on the 
metal surfaces, then they slowly propagate. In these 
conditions, the detection of the leak is possible be-
fore the sudden rupture of the tank. In details, the 
analyses have highlighted that TOP events 1, 2 and 3 
lead to the rupture of the inner tank, whereas TOP 
event 4 generates failure on the outer casing. In the 
first case, the LOX penetrates into the annular space 
and ice forms on the outer casing; this can be visual-
ly detected. In the latter case, when the external ves-
sel breaks, there is a release of perlite in the air, 
which, again, is easily detectable. 
As in ordinary conditions, the loads correspond-
ing to TOP events 1, 2 and 3 show that the weak sec-
tion of the storage system lies in correspondence of 
the conjunction between the wall and the dome of 
the inner vessel. TOP event 4, instead, particularly 
stresses the surface of the vertical wall. 
The results are compliant with the adopted manu-
facturing standards; in fact, quoting EIGA IGC Doc 
127/13:  
“The need to prevent a rupture by overpressure at 
the bottom of the inner tank is identified in the vari-
ous available codes. API 650 talks of a frangible 
joint between the roof and the shell and gives it as a 
possible purchaser requirement. API 620, instead, 
establishes a link between the sizing of the anchor-
age straps and the design of the roof to shell junc-
tion. Finally, BS 7777 explicitly states that the 
weakest point of the structure shall not be at the bot-
tom and present it as a further increase in safety”. 
3.4  Conclusions 
The present study has been performed with the aim 
of evaluating the risks related to the catastrophic 
rupture of a flat bottom cryogenic tank containing 
liquefied gas. To do this, the cryogenic storage sys-
tem has been deeply investigated in order to identify 
all the critical events that may evolve in dangerous 
scenarios affecting the structural safety of the cryo-
genic tank, together with their associated occurrence 
probabilities. 
Four critical events have been identified, whose 
occurrence frequencies are very low. It has also 
emerged that regular inspections of PSVs yield a 
significant reduction in the occurrence frequencies 
of the top events.  
The robustness of the risk analysis results has 
been checked by means of sensitivity and uncertain-
ty analysis. 
The structural behavior of the flat bottom tank 
has been analyzed both in ordinary operating condi-
tions and in case of exceptional loads, due to the oc-
currence of the individuated TOP events, with the 
aim of assessing whether the identified scenarios 
produce loads that may lead to the rupture of the an-
alyzed vessel.  
As expected, the analysis performed in ordinary 
conditions has shown that the tank is not subjected 
to excessive stresses and strains. The analyses under 
the conditions brought by the critical events have al-
lowed: 
 Estimating the load conditions that lead to the 
rupture of the tank structure.  
 Checking that there is a release of LOX or perlite 
when such load values are reached. This entails 
that both the failures of the inner and outer ves-
sels can be detected.  
 Verifying that an explosion of the tank can be 
regarded as improbable, due to the slow varia-
tion in level and pressure. 
Finally, the structural analysis has also highlighted, 
in both ordinary and extreme conditions, the struc-
ture weakness in correspondence of the conjunction 
between the wall and the dome of the inner vessel, 
except for TOP event 4. This is compliant with the 
recommendations of the design codes API 620, API 
650 and BS 7777, which require to design the ves-
sels in such a way to ensure that the weakest point of 
the inner tank is not at the bottom cylindrical seam, 
but at the top of the vessel (EIGA 2013). 
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